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Introduction
Lay participation in the administration of justice, be it in the form of
juries, mixed tribunal assessors, magistrates, or lay courts, is a cornerstone
of democratic government. Kalven and Zeisel, two prominent jury schol-
ars, describe the Anglo-American jury as:
[A] remarkable political institution.... It recruits a group of twelve laymen,
chosen at random from the widest population; it convenes them for the pur-
pose of the particular trial; it entrusts them with great official powers of
decision; it permits them to carry on deliberations in secret and to report
out their final judgment without giving reasons for it; and, after their
momentary service to the state has been completed, it orders them to dis-
band and return to private life. 1
However, whereas juries have both been glorified and heavily scruti-
nized, lay judges, who serve jointly with professional judges on mixed
tribunals, uniformly generate negative comments: "puppets with strings in
the hands of the professional judges" in Germany;2 "bodyguards for the
[professional] judge" in Russia;3 "ears of the deaf-like furniture or decora-
T Associate Professor, College of Criminology & Criminal Justice, Florida State
University; skutnjak@fsu.edu.
1. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966).
2. Arnd Koch, C.J.A. Mittermaier and the 19th Century Debate About Juries and
Mixed Courts, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 347, 353 (2001).
3. George Feifer, Justice in Moscow, in LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1001
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay eds., 2nd ed. 1977).
40 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 429 (2007)
Cornell International Law Journal
tion" in China;4 and "two heads of cabbage behind which is hidden the
professional judge" in Croatia.5 If mixed tribunals have been mocked to
the point that these criticisms are becoming entrenched in the folk culture,
why have they been preserved as crucial elements of the legal systems
across Europe for many centuries? Do these criticisms have merit? How
do mixed tribunals actually operate? What do mixed tribunals signify for
lay participation across the world?
As many countries, such as Russia,6 Spain, 7 Japan,8 and South
Africa,9 are in the process of reviving lay participation, this article seeks to
provide qualified answers to these questions, expand our understanding of
the phenomenon of lay judges in mixed tribunals, and help establish the
key elements for successful lay participation in legal decision-making. Part
I identifies the basic characteristics of mixed tribunals. Part II describes
the legal framework within which mixed tribunals operate. Part III pro-
vides a theoretical underpinning for mixed tribunals. Part IV explores the
interaction between lay and professional judges serving on these tribunals.
Part V presents lessons derived from the actual operation of mixed tribu-
nals. The article concludes with suggestions for enhancing the system of
mixed tribunals.
I. Learning about the Players: Mixed Tribunals in a Nutshell
Mixed tribunals have been an integral part of the court system in the
Western democracies, such as Germany, 10  Austria, 1  Denmark,1 2
4. Liling Yue, The Lay Assessor System in China, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 51, 52
(2001).
5. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovit, Mixed Tribunals in Croatia, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 57, 74
(2001).
6. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 241 (1998); Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The Cases of
Spain and Russia, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 61 (1995); Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain
and Russia, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, Japan's New System of Mixed Courts: Some Sugges-
tions Regarding Their Future Form and Procedures, 2001 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLAN-
TIC L.J. 89 (2001); Richard 0. Lempert, Citizen Participation in Judicial Decision Making:
Juries, Lay Judges and Japan, 2001 ST. Louis-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Milton Seligson, Lay Participation in South Africa from Apartheid to
Majority Rule, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 273 (2001).
10. See, e.g., AXEL GORLITZ, VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEUTSCHLAND (1970);
Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135 (1972); EKKEHARD KLAUSA, EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER (1972);Jutta Gerken, Bfir-
ger als Richter: UberJugendschoffen und den Erziehungsanspruch des Jugensdstrafrechts, in
EIN TROJANISCHES PFERD IM RECHTSSTAAT 101 (Jutta Gerken & Karl F. Schumann eds.,
1988); Stefan Machura, Interaction Between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in Ger-
man Mixed Courts, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 451 (2001); Walter Perron, Lay Participation in
Germany, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 181 (2001); Christoph Rennig, Influence of Lay Asses-
sors and Giving Reasons for the Judgment in German Mixed Courts, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L.
481 (2001).
11. See, e.g., Ingrid Frassine et al., Kapitel: Osterreich, in DER LAIENRICHTER IM STRAF-
PROZESS 87 (Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel eds., 1979).
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France, 13 Finland, 14 Norway 15 and Sweden, 16 as well as in the former
socialist countries (and their legal successors), such as the former Czecho-
slovakia, 17 the former German Democratic Republic, 18 Hungary, 19
Poland,20 the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2 1 and the former
Yugoslavia. 2 2 The most recent addition of mixed tribunals to a legal system
took place in South Africa. 23 The primary rationale for introducing mixed
tribunals into the legal system is that lay participation will democratize the
criminal justice process and enhance its legitimacy: 24 lay participation pro-
motes justice and equity, 25 introduces community values and local knowl-
edge, 2 6 brings a fresh perspective, 2 7 allows citizens to participate in the
12. See, e.g., Stanley Anderson, Lay Judges and Jurors in Denmark, .38 Am. J. COME. L.
839; Peter Garde, The Danish Jury, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 87 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Michel Bonnieu, The Presumption of Innocence and The Cour d'Assises: Is
France Ready for Adversarial Procedure?, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 559 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Heikki PihlajamAki, From Compurgators to Mixed Courts: Reflections on
the Historical Development of Finnish Evidence Law and Court Structure, 72 INT'L REV.
PENAL L. 159 (2001).
15. See, e.g., Asbjorn Strandbakken, Lay Participation in Norway, 72 INT'L REV. PENAL
L. 225 (2001).
16. See, e.g., HANNU TAPANI KLAMI & MERVA HAMALAINEN, LAWYERS AND LAYMEN ON
THE BENCH (1992); Christian Diesen, Lay Judges in Sweden-A Short Introduction, 72 INT'L
REV. PENAL L. 313 (2001).
17. See, e.g., Zdenek Krystufek, The Function of the Lay Judge in Czechoslovakia, in
ZUR SOZIOLOGIE DES GERICHTSVERFAHRENS [SOCIOLOGY OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS] 301 (Law-
rence M. Friedman & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 1976).
18. See, e.g., Irmgard Buchholz, The Role of the Lay Assessors in The German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR), 10 INT'L J. COMp. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 215 (1986).
19. See, e.g., KdlmAn Kulcsdr, Lay Participation in Organizational Decision Making, in
HUNGARIAN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES 151 (Paul Halmos & Martin Albrow eds., 1972); KAL-
MAN KULCSAR, PEOPLE'S ASSESSORS IN THE COURTS (1982).
20. See, e.g., Leszek Kubicki, Udzial Lawnikow W Orzekaniu, in UDziAl LAWNIKOW W
POSTEPOWANIU KARNYM [LAY ASSESSOR JUDGES IN PENAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE LIGHT OF
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH] 68, 97-111 (Leszek Kubicki & Sylwester Zawadzki eds., 1970).
21. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, Juries and Mixed Courts in the former Soviet
Republics of Central ASia, Lecture at the Cornell Law School Clarke Program in East
Asian Law and Culture Conference: Citizen Participation in East Asian Legal Systems
(Sep. 22, 2006).
22. See, e.g., SAMUEL KAMHI & BRANKO EALIJA, SISTEM POROTE U NASOJ ZEMLJI I PROBLEMI
VEZANI ZA UEESCE GRADJANA U VPSENJU PRAVOSUDJA (1974); VLADIMIR LJUBANOVIC,
DEMOKRATIZACIJA KRIVItNOG PRAVOSUDJA (1989); Vladimir Ljubanovi, Sudjelovanje
gradjana u suvremenom jugoslavenskom krivi~nom sudjenju (1983) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Zagreb, Croatia).
23. After decades of having mixed tribunals as a never-exercised option (pending
approval from the Ministry of Justice, lay judges could have assisted the professional
judge), South Africa amended the statute in 1991 (the magistrates at district courts now
have the right to appoint zero, one, or two lay judges for the upcoming trial) and opened
the doors to lay participation by easing the appointment process. This was done "in an
attempt to involve the black majority in the all-white court system which was seen by
many as illegitimate and unrepresentative." Seligson, supra note 9, at 273. The argu-
ment was that the introduction of lay participants should result in the greater legitimacy
of the court system, which, unfortunately, has not been achieved. See id.
24. Id.
25. See KLAMI & HAmALAINEN, supra note 16.
26. Id. at 15.
27. See Kubicki, supra note 20; see also KULCSAR, supra note 19.
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administration of justice,28 serves as a deterrent safeguard, 29 and protects
against potential tyranny by the government.30
Mixed tribunals are heterogeneous groups that consist of lay judges
and professional judges who jointly decide legal cases. Professional and
lay judges sit together during trials, hear and examine evidence, and delib-
erate before making a decision. It is a unique form of lay participation
because professional judges have an opportunity to "correct" the views of
lay judges and explain the law; at the same time, lay judges have the oppor-
tunity to "correct" the professional judge's view by bringing the fresh
approach of an average citizen.31 Lay judges are common citizens,
expected to possess neither legal education nor training in legal decision-
making. Some countries, such as France,32 Germany 33 and Norway,34
explicitly prohibit certain occupations with legal education or experience-
professional judges, prosecutors, attorneys, or police officers-from serv-
ing as lay judges to preserve this common lay element. Many countries,
such as Croatia35 and Germany, 36 also require that lay judges possess non-
legal specialized skills, such as a degree in educational studies or parenting
experience, to serve in select types of cases, primarily those dealing with
juvenile defendants. 37 Norway, for example, allows the court president to
appoint expert judges in complex cases of economic crimes.38
There is substantial variation in the size and composition of mixed
tribunals across the world.39 If countries incorporate mixed tribunals of
different sizes in their legal systems, then the tribunal size is proportional
to the severity of the statutory punishment. Typically, as in Croatia and
Germany, the less serious cases are typically assigned to small mixed tribu-
nals composed of one professional judge and two lay judges, whereas the
28. Yue, supra note 4.
29. See, e.g., Maria Borucka-Arctowa, Citizen Participation in the Administration of
Justice: Research and Policy in Poland, in ZUR SOZIOLOGIE DES GERICHTSVERFAHRENS [Soci-
OLOGY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS) 286 (1976); KULCSAR, supra note 19.
30. Bonnieu, supra note 13.
31. See Bolitha J. Laws, Lay Assistance in Improving Judicial Administration, 287
ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 169 (1953).
32. See Bonnieu, supra note 13, at 562.
33. See Perron, supra note 10, at 191.
34. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 243.
35. See Kutnjak lvkovik, supra note 5, at 66.
36. See Machura, supra note 10, at 453; see also Perron, supra note 10, at 191.
37. But see, e.g., Yue, supra note 4, at 55; Garde, supra note 12, at 109; Seligson,
supra note 9, at 278.
38. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 244-45.
39. France has mixed tribunals only for serious cases-five years of imprisonment or
more-tried at the Cour d'Assises. See Bonnieu, supra note 13, at 559. The tribunal is
relatively large, composed of three professional judges and nine lay judges. See id. Den-
mark has mixed tribunals at courts of first instance composed of one professional and
two lay judges. See Garde, supra note 12, at 91. Sweden has one professional and three
lay judges deciding criminal cases in the first instance. See Diesen, supra note 16, at
314. Finland has had a mixed tribunal in rural areas composed of one professional and
seven lay judges since the Middle Ages, but a recent change reduced the size of the
tribunal to one professional judge and three lay judges. See PihlajamAki, supra note 14,
at 159.
Vol. 40
2007 Exploring Lay Participation
more serious cases are assigned to larger mixed tribunals.40 In some coun-
tries, such as Croatia41 and Norway, 42 lay judges in large mixed tribunals
outnumber professional judges, 43 whereas in other countries, such as Ger-
many, 44 the number of professional judges is greater than or equal to the
number of lay judges on the tribunal. 45 Traditionally, a single professional
judge decides the least serious cases to increase efficiency and cut costs. 46
Offenses typically assigned to a single professional judge are punishable by
fine4 7 or short-tern imprisonment. 4 Consequently, single professional
judges handle most criminal cases. 49
Including mixed tribunals at the trial stage does not automatically
guarantee lay participation at the appellate stage. For example, China pro-
vides professional judges with the exclusive authority to decide appeals
and review capital cases. 50 Similarly, Croatia assigns appeals to tribunals
composed only of professional judges.51 Even though Sweden includes lay
judges in appellate decision-making, it gives the majority vote to profes-
sional judges.52 Germany differentiates between two types of post-convic-
tion reviews, and lay participation depends upon the type of review. 53
40. See Kutnjak lvkovit, supra note 5, at 65 (describing Croatia); see also Perron,
supra note 10, at 182 (describing Germany).
41. See Kutnjak Ivkovit, supra note 5, at 65.
42. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 225.
43. The Croatian grand mixed tribunal, assigned to try cases for which the maxi-
mum sentence exceeds fifteen years of imprisonment, is composed of two professional
and three lay judges. See Kutnjak lvkovit, supra note 5, at 63. The Norwegian grand
mixed tribunal, assigned to cases concerning felonies punishable with imprisonment of
more than six years, is also composed of two professional judges and three lay judges.
See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 230.
44. See Perron, supra note 10, at 188-89.
45. The Strafkammer court at the Landgerichte is composed of two or three profes-
sional judges and two lay judges. See id. at 188.
46. For example, Croatia determines that the jurisdiction of the single professional
judge is crimes punishable by fine or imprisonment of up to three years. See SANJA
KUTNJAK IVKOVIC, LAY PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: THE CASE OF CROATIA (1999); see
also Yue, supra note 4 (reporting that the single professional judge tries minor cases).
47. Denmark assigns cases for which the potential penalty is only a fine or a warn-
ing to the professional judge, and assigns any cases that potentially carry imprisonment
to the mixed tribunal. See Garde, supra note 12, at 87.
48. See, e.g., Perron, supra note 10, at 182 (reporting that Germany assigns a single
professional judge to offenses that require up to two years of imprisonment); see also
KUTNJAK IVKOVIC , supra note 46 (reporting that Croatia assigns a single professional
judge to offenses that require up to three years of imprisonment).
49. In Denmark, single professional judges decide about 60,000 criminal cases
every year, and, out of these, approximately 10,000 result from the abbreviated trial
following a confession. See Garde, supra note 12, at 87. Mixed tribunals decide only
11,000 criminal cases every year. See id. Similarly, a single professional judge in Ger-
many decides 86% of the criminal cases in the first instance, while mixed tribunals only
decide 14% of the cases. See Perron, supra note 10, at 188.
50. See Yue, supra note 4, at 51.
51. See Kutnjak lvkovit, supra note 5, at 65.
52. See Diesen, supra note 16, at 314.
53. If the Landgericht is the court of second instance, then lay judges do not partici-
pate in the Revision, which only addresses legal issues, but they do participate in
Berufung, which addresses both factual and legal issues. See Perron, supra note 10, at
182.
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Denmark is one of the countries that provide the greatest degree of lay
involvement at the appellate level, as three professional judges and three lay
judges comprise each appellate tribunal.5 4
II. Setting the Stage: The Mixed Tribunal's Legal Environment
Most countries5 5 that incorporate mixed tribunals derive their legal
systems from the civil law tradition.5 6 The well-established differences
between civil law and common-law traditions5 7 create legal environments
distinct not only in terms of substantive and procedural criminal law, but
also in terms of legal education and status of the legal profession. Despite
many disparities in the criminal procedure rules across the civil-law coun-
tries themselves, there are also numerous similarities that directly affect
mixed tribunals.
First, in civil law countries the defendant's confession does not cir-
cumvent the trial.58 Rather, these countries treat the confession as an
important, but not determinative, piece of evidence.5 9 Members of the
mixed tribunal will evaluate the confession together with other evidence.
However, a defendant's confession may shorten the duration of the trial, 60
lead toward an abbreviated trial,6 1 or result in summary judgment.6 2
Second, unlike common law systems, in which a defendant may select
between a bench or jury trial, civil law systems, such as Croatia, 63 Ger-
many, 64 and Norway, 6 5 traditionally do not allow defendants to choose the
decision-maker. However, if the procedural rules allow an abbreviated trial
following a confession of guilt, as in Denmark, the parties may request a
trial by a mixed tribunal, instead of a bench trial, in lieu of the jury trial.6 6
54. Garde, supra note 12, at 91.
55. China utilizes mixed tribunals, yet its legal system is socialist, not civil. See Yue,
supra note 4; see also ERIA FAIRCHILD & HARRY R. DAMMER, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JuS-
TICE SYSTEMS (2nd ed. 2001). However, criminal procedure in socialist countries is simi-
lar to, and derived from, criminal procedures in civil law countries. See Yue, supra note
4 ("[Tlhe reformed [Chinese] criminal procedure law constitutes a move from [the]
inquisitorial model to the adversary trial by making the judge's role less dominant and
active as before.").
56. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 55. The regimes that preceded socialist
regimes in former socialist countries incorporated the civil law tradition. Therefore, it is
not surprising that their successor countries are all classified as civil law countries. See
id. Norway's legal system is a combination of civil and common law traditions. See id.;
see also Strandbakken, supra note 15. Similarly, the South-African legal system is a mix-
ture of both civil and common law traditions. See FAIRCHILD & DAMMER, supra note 55.
57. See PHILIP L. REICHEL, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (4th ed. 2005).
58. See International Association of Judges, The Role of the Accused in the Proof of
Guilt: Confessions and the Right of Silence (1997), http://www.iaj-uim.org; see also Perron,
supra note 10, at 189.
59. See International Association of Judges, supra note 58.
60. See Perron, supra note 10, at 189.
61. See Garde, supra note 12, at 89.
62. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 230.
63. See Kutnjak Ivkovit, supra note 5.
64. See Perron, supra note 10, at 182.
65. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 230.
66. See Garde, supra note 12, at 89.
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In Norway, if the prosecutor requests and the defendant consents, then the
corroborated confession of a crime punishable by less than ten years
imprisonment will lead to a summary judgment instead of trial by a mixed
tribunal.6 7 Unlike defendants, prosecutors effectively decide whether a
single professional judge or a mixed tribunal decides the case because
prosecutors control which charge to file and with which court to file it.
6 8
Suggesting a punishment to the courts will not affect whether a single pro-
fessional judge or a mixed tribunal decides the case, however, because the
courts need not follow the punishment that the prosecutor requested in the
indictment. 69
Third, compared to the common-law tradition, the civil-law tradition
requires decision-makers to perform more active roles in criminal cases. 70
The mixed tribunal functions as an active inquisitor who seeks evidence
and controls the nature and objectives of the inquiry. Even in Norway,
whose legal system is grounded in a mixture of adversarial and inquisito-
rial criminal procedure, the mixed tribunal is expected to be active. Specif-
ically, the court "has an independent duty to ensure that the facts of the
case are clarified ... [and] may decide to obtain new evidence."'7 1 A differ-
ent question, addressed later in this paper, and common to all systems
using mixed tribunals, is whether all members of the tribunal defacto share
this burden equally.
Croatia's criminal procedure law of 1993 illustrates a typical continen-
tal European system of mixed tribunals. After the investigative judge
declares the indictment valid, 7 2 the professional judge determines the trial
date and summons the defendant, witnesses, and expert witnesses. 7 3 The
professional judge controls the trial 74 and has the responsibility of provid-
ing for a thorough examination of the case.75 The trial officially begins
with the reading of the indictment. 76 If necessary, the professional judge
offers an additional explanation of the charges. The defendant is then
asked to give a statement.7 7 The defendant's confession does not circum-
vent the trial because the tribunal still must examine other evidence and
question witnesses and expert witnesses. 78 The professional judge ques-
tions the defendant first, and other members of the tribunal, the prosecu-
67. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 230.
68. See, e.g., Perron, supra note 10, at 182. However, prosecutorial decisions may be
driven more by the nature and number of appeals subsequently available than by the
extent to which lay judges participate in the tribunal. See id. at 189.
69. The courts must conform to the range of available punishments predetermined
by the statute and to the statutory decision-maker, such as a single judge, small mixed
tribunal, or large mixed tribunal.
70. See REICHEL, supra note 57.
71. See Strandbakken, supra note 15, at 229.
72. See Narodne novine [Criminal Procedure Law] No. 38/93, § 278 (Croatia).
73. See id. §§ 279-86.
74. See id. § 292.
75. See id.
76. See id. § 315.
77. See id. § 316.
78. See id.
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tor, the victim, and the defense attorney may subsequently question the
defendant either directly or through the professional judge. 79 The profes-
sional judge's interrogation is the dominant one-the "fundamental exami-
nation"-and the questioning by other participants is prescribed to be
"supplementary." The trial proceeds with the examination of witnesses
and the presentation of material evidence.80 The tribunal not only deter-
mines which evidence will be examined and which witnesses will be heard
(and in which order), but also performs the actual examination or ques-
tioning.8 1 After the tribunal determines that the examination of evidence
is complete, the parties give their closing statements and the tribunal
declares the trial over.8 2 The parties leave the courtroom and the tribunal
deliberates and votes.8 3 The decisions, covering both factual and legal
issues, are made after oral discussion.8 4 Each tribunal member's vote car-
ries the same weight, regardless of whether the member is a lay or profes-
sional judge, and the presiding judge votes last.8 5 A majority vote suffices
for a valid legal decision.8 6
III. Predicting the Group Dynamic: Status Characteristics Theory
Berger and colleagues 87 developed status characteristics theory to
explain interaction in small task-oriented groups. The theory states that
individuals in task-oriented groups develop expectations about the poten-
tial contributions of group members toward the resolution of the task.8 8
The bases for these expectations are status characteristics, attributes
whose culturally specified meaning makes them potentially relevant to the
performance of the group's task.8 9 Some of the status characteristics may
be of direct relevance to the successful completion of the task; such charac-
teristics are called specific status characteristics. 90 Some status character-
istics may be related to the task indirectly, in which case they are called
diffuse status characteristics. 9 1
79. See id.
80. See id. § 322.
81. See id.
82. See id. §§ 339-44.
83. See id. § 344.
84. See id. § 116.
85. See id. § 116.
86. See id.
87. See JOSEPH BERGER ET AL., STATUS CHARACTERISTICS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION
(1977); see also Joseph Berger et al., Status Organizing Processes, 6 ANN. REV. Soc. 479
(1980) [hereinafter Berger (1980)]; see also Joseph Berger et al., Status Cues, Expecta-
tions, and Behavior, 3 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 121 (1986) [hereinafter Berger
(1986)].
88. See Joseph A. Bonito, A Longitudinal Social Relations Analysis of Participation in
Small Groups, 32 HUM. COMM. RES. 302 (2006).
89. See James W. Balkwell, Status, in GROUP PROCESS: SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES 119,
124 (Martha Foschi & Edward J. Lawler eds., 1994).
90. See Bonito, supra note 88.
91. See Balkwell, supra note 89.
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Mixed tribunals are task-oriented groups and their task is legal deci-
sion-making, that is, deciding the defendant's guilt and, if appropriate,
determining the sentence. Professional and lay judges in mixed tribunals
differ in terms of two specific status characteristics: legal education and
legal decision-making experience acquired through systematic training and
regular practice. Professional judges in mixed tribunals are law school
graduates who have completed their legal training, have passed the bar
exam, and have a certain number of years of experience working on legal
issues after passing the bar exam. Lay judges are neither educated in law
nor experienced in resolving legal issues. Typically, they are elected for a
period of four years and only occasionally serve as lay judges. Because lay
judges may serve more than once during their mandate, they may possess
some experience in legal decision-making. However, their experience is
gathered ad hoc and only sporadically, lacking systematic training.
Status characteristics theory suggests that, if the members of the
group differ in regard to a specific status characteristic, that specific char-
acteristic will become activated and will thereby be an important factor in
the group dynamic.9 2 Because group members can differ along more than
one characteristic, be it specific or diffuse, the theory describes how mem-
bers combine all status information on multiple characteristics to form
aggregate performance expectations and indicates that specific status char-
acteristics will carry greater weight in the formation of aggregate perform-
ance expectations than diffuse status characteristics. 93 Thus, according to
the aggregation hypothesis, 94 the performance expectation and power of
each group member will include information about all status characteris-
tics, be they specific or diffuse, but different weights will be attached to
them.
In the context of mixed tribunals, specific status characteristics, such
as legal education and experience in legal decision-making, will have a
stronger impact on the overall expectations surrounding the judges' ability
to decide legal cases than diffuse status characteristics, such as gender or
age. For example, it seems plausible that a relatively inexperienced young
female professional judge will have a lower status than an experienced
older male professional judge. However, the relative strength of specific
status characteristics suggests that the status of either of these two profes-
sional judges in the tribunal would be higher than the status of, for exam-
ple, an older male physician serving as a lay judge.
A lay judge's non-legal education may have an impact on his or her
status in the tribunal. Mudd argues that "thinking like a lawyer" has two
important components.9 5 The first component is critical thinking, which
involves clarity, precision, and quality of thinking not "different in kind
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See John 0. Mudd, Thinking Critically About "Thinking Like a Lawyer", 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 704 (1983).
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from thinking like a physicist or philosopher. ' '96 The second component is
the ability to use and practice these skills to solve real legal problems. 97
Highly educated lay participants are likely better to deal with the first com-
ponent of thinking like a lawyer-critical thinking-which involves a num-
ber of skills ranging from the ability to define a problem to the ability to
draw appropriate conclusions. 9 8 Not only are the highly educated lay
judges more likely to understand the law when it is explained to them, but
they will also be better able to define legal problems and provide relevant
hypotheses.
The second component of thinking like a lawyer, the ability to use and
practice these skills to solve real legal problems,9 9 ultimately differentiates
professional judges from educated lay judges. Although educated lay
judges are likely to understand the legal concepts and rules once explained
to them, only lawyers receive systematic training in defining a legal prob-
lem, selecting factors important for the definition and resolution of the
problem, forming relevant hypotheses, and drawing appropriate conclu-
sions. Their legal skill is further enhanced by the opportunity to regularly
practice legal decision-making in trials and thereby amass considerable
experience.
The task of making legal decisions, especially in Roman law countries,
substantially relies on the knowledge of existing legal rules and their appli-
cation to a particular case, t0 0 which makes legal education crucial.
Whereas sentiments or community values might lead jurors to nullify the
law if they believe that its application will result in gross injustice, mixed
tribunals decide within the framework of existing legal rules and must pro-
vide reasons for their decision in a written verdict. The verdict, written by
the presiding professional judge, may be reviewed on appeal, which may be
initiated by either party, regardless of whether the decision was an acquit-
tal or conviction. 1 1 A serious violation of legal rules, either procedural or
substantive, provides grounds for appeal, annulment of the verdict, and the
return of the case for trial de novo. 10 2
Knowledge of law is particularly important for mixed tribunals, but
knowledge of other fields or extensive life experience may be important for
resolution of cases as well. Lay judges who have direct specialized knowl-
edge of other non-legal fields crucial for decision-making in a particular
case, such as physicians in cases involving assault or murder or car
96. Id. at 706.
97. See id. at 704.
98. See PAUL L. DRESSEL & LEwis B. MAYHEW, GENERAL EDUCATION: EXPLORATIONS IN
EVALUATION 179-80 (identifying five critical thinking skills: (1) the ability to define a
problem; (2) the ability to select pertinent information for the solution of the problem;
(3) the ability to recognize stated and unstated assumptions; (4) the ability to formulate
and select relevant and promising hypotheses; and (5) the ability to draw conclusions
validly and to judge the validity of inferences).
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mechanics in cases involving a traffic accident, will probably have a higher
status in the tribunal, their comments will be deemed more influential, and
they will be provided with more floor time. The Croatian legal system cur-
rently recognizes the specific contributions that such expert lay judges can
make in certain areas. For example, Croatian law requires in criminal
cases concerning juveniles that lay judges be selected from the ranks of
professors, teachers, and other persons with experience in juvenile
education.' 0 3
Status characteristics are important not only because of the different
expectations associated with each member, but also because they have con-
sequences for group behavior. Groups tend to allocate more or less floor
time to certain members in direct relation to how useful the expected con-
tribution inferred from the member's status is.10 4 Members with high sta-
tus in a group will be given more opportunities to contribute, and their
contributions are more likely to receive favorable reactions from others.' 0 5
Prior studies on the interaction in small groups clearly support the status
characteristics theory, as individuals with higher status are more likely to
interrupt, be successful in interrupting when they interact with lower sta-
tus individuals, 10 6 speak first during interactions, 10 7 and talk quickly' 0 8
and loudly. 10 9
Empirical studies indicate that the quantity and quality of verbal con-
tributions to a group interaction affect the opinion that group members
have about the speaker's competence, influence, and leadership ability.1 0
Thus, the benefits gained from higher status exceed the simple floor time
phenomenon. Even when high and low status individuals behave in a simi-
lar way, higher status individuals are evaluated more positively."' Meeker
and Weitzel-O'Neill argue that this happens because low status members
are perceived not only as less competent, but also as lacking legitimacy if
they contribute more than expected from an individual of their status. 112
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104. See Balkwell, supra note 89.
105. See Berger (1980), supra note 87.
106. See WILLIAM M. O'BAR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN
THE COURTROOM (1982); see also Derek Roger & Willfried Nesshoever, Individual Differ-
ences in Dyadic Conversational Strategies, 26 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (1987); see also
William T. Rogers & Jones, Effects of Dominance Tendencies on Floor Holding and Inter-
ruption Behavior in Dyadic Interaction, 1 HUM. COMM. RES. 113 (1975).
107. See Theodore A. Lamb, Nonverbal and Paraverbal Control in Dyads and Triads: Sex
or Power Differences?, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 49 (1981); see also Cecilia L. Ridgeway et al.,
Nonverbal Cues and Status: An Expectation States Approach, 90 Am. J. Soc. 955 (1985).
108. See Richard M. Sorrentino & Robert G. Boutillier, The Effect of Quantity and
Quality of Verbal Interaction on Ratings of Leadership Ability, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 403 (1975).
109. See William T. Packwood, Loudness as a Variable in Persuasion, 21 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 1 (1974).
110. See Sorrentino & Boutillier, supra note 108; see also Linda L. Carli, Gender, Sta-
tus, and Influence, 8 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 89 (1991)
111. See Ronald Humphrey, How Work Roles Influence Perception: Structural-Cognitive
Processes and Organizational Behavior, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 242 (1985).
112. See B. F. Meeker & P. A. Weitzel-O'Neill, Sex Roles and Interpersonal Behavior in
Task-Oriented Groups, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 91 (1977).
Cornell International Law Journal
High status members are expected to further enhance their status, while an
attempt by low status members to increase their status is not viewed favor-
ably. The only exception is when a leader explicitly puts low status mem-
bers in a leadership position or when low status members show a desire to
help the group resolve the task instead of achieving their own goals. 113
Consistent with the status characteristics theory, professional judges
possess high specific status characteristic and a higher status on the tribu-
nal. They are expected to be more competent, lay judges will evaluate them
as more competent, and the professional judge actually will perform better
and more frequently in achieving the resolution of the group task than lay
judges. An important caveat is that the professional judge's status is par-
tially predetermined by law, which requires that presiding professional
judges lead and coordinate trials.1 14 That is, the institutional framework
mandates that lay judges have less floor time or opportunities to partici-
pate, and, when they do participate, their contribution will be considered
of lesser importance than the contribution made by professional judges.
According to the status characteristics theory, high status members in
small groups, such as professional judges in mixed tribunals, are more
influential than low status members. 1 1 5 This influence can be exerted in
two ways: resolving disagreements in the direction of their initial opinion
and being selected as leaders. Berger and colleagues explicitly hypothesize
that high status members in small groups are expected to wield more influ-
ence when disagreements occur, not because of the strength of the argu-
ment, but because of the power of the argument's source, which leads
toward resolution of disagreements in their favor. 1 6 Another consequence
of this influence is that high status members, such as professional judges
in mixed tribunals, frequently will be selected as leaders. 1 1 7 This suggests
that professional judges, statutorily placed in a leadership position during
trials, also will be expected to take a leadership position during
deliberations.
IV. Exploring Mixed Tribunals: The Reality Check
How frequently do lay judges actively participate by providing their
opinions, bringing community values, disagreeing with the professional
judge, or protecting the innocent from government tyranny? Are lay judges
successfully able to perform all of these idealized roles?
Empirical studies suggest that lay judges were neither perceived as
very active during trials and deliberations, nor were their contributions
evaluated as important. Based on estimates and observations of trials,
Kubicki and Zawadzki 1 8 reported that two-thirds of lay judges surveyed in
113. See Carli, supra note 110.
114. See id. at 91.
115. See id.
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Poland did not ask any questions during trials. KulcsAr 1 19 wrote that at
least one-half of lay judges in Hungary failed to make comments of
merit;120 moreover, only one of eleven lay judges in Poland read the case
file. 1 2 1 Similarly, Croatian lay judges, professional judges, state prosecu-
tors, and defense attorneys all reported that lay judges asked questions
"very infrequently" or "never."'1 22 Furthermore, when asked about the
importance of the lay judges' questions, the majority of lawyers perceived
them to be "somewhat important" or "not important at all."'12 3
Professional judges surveyed in the Croatian study reported that lay
judges only infrequently made comments during deliberations and that
those comments were evaluated as only somewhat important, whereas lay
judges surveyed in the same study reported making comments more fre-
quently. 124 Not surprisingly, lay judges and professional judges' percep-
tions regarding the frequency of lay judges' comments during deliberations
were different. 125 When asked about major problems related to lay judges'
comments, the majority of professional judges did not blame lay judges for
failing to follow the trial carefully, for their lack of interest in participation,
or for their inability to understand evidence. Rather, they attributed prob-
lematic lay judge commentary during deliberation to the lay judges' lack of
legal knowledge or their lack of understanding of legal norms. 126 In other
words, the greatest problem, according to the surveyed professional judges,
is the very essence of "lay" in lay judges-their lack of legal knowledge.
Quite expectedly, professional judges dominated deliberations, 12 7 lay
judges rarely disagreed with professional judges, 12 8 and, whenever dis-
agreements did occur, it was the lay judges who changed their opinions to
resolve disagreements. 12 9 According to professional and lay judges sur-
veyed in the Croatian study, lay judges disagreed with professional judges
"in only a few cases" or "never."' 130 In the few cases in which they did
disagree, it seems that lay judges rarely exercised their right to outvote pro-
fessional judges. Diesen reports that lay judges surveyed in Sweden out-
voted the professional judge in only one to three percent of all criminal
cases. 13 1 Machura writes that less than one-fifth of lay judges in both
Bochum and Frankfurt, Germany reported stating an opinion different
119. See KULCSAR, supra note 19.
120. See id.
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from the professional judges' during deliberations. 132 Professional and lay
judges in South Africa also report that disagreements are rare. 1 3 3
Most studies reported that the majority of court decisions, sometimes
up to ninety-five percent, were unanimous verdicts. 134 It appears that lay
judges have a higher chance of being talked into accepting a different opin-
ion, even when the professional judge is in the minority, than of convinc-
ing other tribunal members to accept their opinion:
A detailed analysis of the data collected by Casper & Zeisel and Renning
shows that the lay assessors' chances to prevail tend towards zero if the lay
assessors do not hold a common position at the outset of the deliberation. A
professional judge in the minority has quite a good chance to convince one
of the two lay assessors. A lay assessor in the minority will rather be con-
vinced by the majority than be convincing himself. 13 5
Perron summarizes the results of German studies on mixed tribunals:
All these studies unanimously point to the limited influence of lay judges in
the German criminal trial. Professional and lay judges do not often disagree
and the little discordance they have usually related to the sentence rather
than the question of guilt. If an agreement cannot be reached, it is usually
the professional judges who assert themselves against their lay colleagues.
All interviews confirmed, however, that lay judges do influence judicial
decisions to a certain extent. 13 6
These findings support the basic status characteristic theory propositions
and provide evidence of the impact of the legal framework: professional
judges dominate deliberations and their voices are more powerful than lay
judges' voices are.
At the theoretical level, a key diffuse status characteristic is the lay
judges' experience (its extent and type). Arzt reports that the longer a lay
judge participates in mixed tribunals, the less likely he or she will be to
influence the outcome. 13 7 Kutnjak Ivkovit examines gender differences
between female and male professional judges, and between female and
male lay judges, regarding perceived lay judges' frequency of participation
in trials and deliberations, importance of their contributions, competence
to make decisions regarding factual and legal issues in the cases, and
strength of their influence through disagreements with professional
132. See Machura, supra note 10, at 462.
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judges). 138 Kutnjak Ivkovit concludes that:
The results of this study suggest that gender, neither lay judges' nor profes-
sional judges', is not an important variable that influences the interaction
between them: out of 16 situations examined, gender differences were statis-
tically significant in only one situation (the professional judges' evaluation
of the lay judges' competence to understand legal issues). In all other situa-
tions, the respondent's gender within a group of lay judges or professional
judges did not influence the answer selected. 13 9
Education in non-legal fields seems more relevant. Krystofek suggests
that if lay judges possess specialized non-legal technical knowledge of the
issues, then they usually express their opinion and tribunals tend to rely
on their expertise. 140 Croatian mixed tribunals indicate that when law-
yers-state attorneys, defense attorneys, and professional judges-were
asked about possible improvements to the existing system of mixed tribu-
nals, they frequently advocated use of blue-ribbon lay judges. 141 One of
the professional judges elaborated:
Mixed tribunals are a positive feature of our legal system, but it is necessary
to elect lay judges more selectively, and to dispatch them to tribunals
depending on their education and occupation. For example:
violent offenses - an average person from the community;
white-collar offenses - persons who were employed in the same
occupation;
traffic offenses - persons who are drivers; and
juvenile delinquency - persons whose occupations are related to
children. 14 2
The overall impression gathered by lawyers was that lay judges made a
minor contribution to resolution of the case 14 3 or that their impact on the
case was minor. 144 For example, Kamhi and lalija report that over sixty
percent of professional judges either did not believe that lay judges influ-
ence the verdicts, or believed that they influenced verdicts rarely, or, even
worse, believed that legal decisions would have been "more correct" but for
the lay judges' participation. 145 Criticism of the mixed tribunal system
was clearly expressed by a district attorney in Croatia:
The professional judge (educated, well paid, interested, ambitious, serious,
conscientious, unburdened...) is the only one competent to decide about
the future of a criminal case. In mixed tribunals, the professional judge de
facto tries the cases, signs, and is responsible for the verdicts. Current lay
judges either do not influence the decision at all or influence it insignifi-
138. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovit, Does Gender Matter: The Role of Gender in Legal Deci-
sion-Making by Croatian Mixed Tribunals, 23 INT'L J. Soc. L. 131 (1995).
139. Id. at 150.
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cantly. There is no use keeping this current system. 14 6
However, lay judges expressed more positive views of their participa-
tion and its importance. For example, lay judges in Croatia were much
more enthusiastic about mixed tribunals than any group of respondents
with a legal background was. 147 More than eighty-five percent of Croatian
lay judges had positive opinions about mixed tribunals, as opposed to
slightly over fifty percent of professional judges or state attorneys. 148 The
most frequent opinion about mixed tribunals was positive, but not highly
enthusiastic ("somewhat favorable"). 1 49 The overwhelming majority of lay
judges in the Polish study 150 and ninety percent of lay judges in Kamhi
and Ealija's study 1 5 1 believed their influence on verdicts was substantial
and beneficial. Lay participants in other studies also expressed a more
positive view regarding their own abilities and role in tribunals than profes-
sional judges. 15 2 However, the majority of lay participants may feel that
their contribution to the tribunal is not crucial. Machura emphasizes that
few German lay judges exert strong influence: "about two of three respon-
dents [lay judges] stated that court would have decided differently without
lay assessors 'in a few cases,' while about 20% said that the court would
have 'almost never' decided differently."
' 153
Although the majority of professional lawyers-professional judges,
state attorneys, and attorneys-in the Polish study supported the idea of lay
participation, most were very critical of its actual implementation.
15 4 Sim-
ilarly, according to Lapaine, lawyers in Croatia support the idea of mixed
tribunals, but are quick to emphasize that the system experiences many
problems. 15 5 Kovaevi points out that these problems reduce the quality
of the system, and that the lay element in mixed tribunals has only a formal
value, not a substantive impact.' 5 6 While most authors who have written
about mixed tribunals discuss negative characteristics of trials by mixed
tribunals, they all agree that the political function of mixed tribunals is
considerably more important, and that this function by itself justifies
retaining the system.1
57
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The idea of lay participation was supported among the respondents
from the Polish study because they believed that lay participation brings
the verdict into accord with public opinion, contributes to the improved
performance of professional judges, and enhances the court's indepen-
dence. 158 Klami and HamAlAinen's study finds that professional judges
from Finland and Sweden emphasized the latent function as the most
important reason in favor of the system of mixed tribunals, whereas they
placed very little importance on the safeguard role.' 5 9 Lay judges reported
that the lay judges' roles are important because "different groups [are rep-
resented]," "evidence [is] evaluated by different people," they provide
"knowledge about local issues... promoting confidence of people" and
they represent the "principle of democracy." 160
V. Jeopardizing the Quality of Lay Participation: Lessons Learned
Regardless of the specific advantages of lay participation envisioned
by its proponents, even systems that look superb on paper might turn into
a bitter disappointment. This section outlines some of the traditional
problems with, and myths about, mixed tribunals.
First, the existing selection processes create pools of lay judges that
represent their communities. The selection process typically involves com-
piling a list of potential candidates who fulfill the eligibility requirements
and do not belong to occupations exempt or excluded from serving. 16 1 In
heterogeneous communities with a strong immigrant population, it is
impossible to achieve the representative pool by imposing the traditional
eligibility requirement of citizenship. 162 Furthermore, politics strongly
affect the selection process. 163 In Norway, the nomination committee
"usually picks most of the candidates from those who are also registered as
members of political parties."' 64 The potential outcome is clear overrepre-
sentation of middle-class citizens and, consequently, significant under-
representation of lower-class citizens. Machura describes the situation in
Germany:
People between 40 and 50 years of age, men and the civil servants are over-
represented. In addition, the lower social classes are underrepresented
among lay assessors. This is particularly true for industrial workers. There
156; Davor Krapac, Neki osnovni problemi u vezi sa sudjelovanjem gradana-nepravnika u
vrgenju sudske funkcije prema odredbama novog krivienog zakonodavstva SFRJ, 31 NASA
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159. See KLAMI & HAMALAINEN, supra note 16, at 55.
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is an overrepresentation of civil servants, who find greater support in being
selected to be a lay judge. It has also been said, that in order to provide the
courts with candidates really interested in being a lay judge, the authorities
in charge actually select people with a judge-like social background and
attitude. 1
65
Another problem affecting the pool of eligible lay judges relates to the
lay judges' tendency to avoid service. Studies on mixed tribunals in the
former Yugoslavia 166 suggest that, although a number of lay judges neither
responded to the court's mail nor participated in trials, the process of dis-
missing such lay judges from duty had never been initiated. 16 7 When
faced with this problem, the courts relied on the lay judges who did
respond and formed a pool of reserve lay judges. 168 If the originally
scheduled lay judges did not appear at court, the reserve lay judges would
assume their positions in the tribunals. Although this solution was practi-
cal and helped courts maintain their caseloads without unnecessary
delays, it contradicted the idea of involving as many citizens as possible in
the criminal justice system.
What were the consequences of not dismissing lay judges who failed
to respond to the courts' mail? The immediate consequence was that either
the court session was postponed, which increased duration of the trial pro-
cess, or the oral presentation of evidence to decision-makers was circum-
vented by reading transcripts of earlier testimonies. According to Bajit-
Petrovie, another long-term consequence was selective re-election of only
those lay judges who responded to the courts' mail. 16 9 Bajit-Petrovit also
argues that such behavior might influence the courtroom atmosphere by
making the presiding professional judge less positive and less sensitive to
lay judge opinions. 1 70
Second, giving lay and professional judges' votes the same weight will
give them equal influence during trials and deliberations. Although virtu-
ally all countries that incorporate mixed tribunals into their criminal jus-
tice systems formally state that professional judges and lay judges are
equal during both trials and deliberations, the reality is different. 17 1 Pro-
cedural rules typically put the professional judge in the driver's seat. For
example, despite the seeming equality of tribunal members in Croatian
mixed tribunals, 1 72 the Croatian Criminal Procedure Law of 1993 assigns
165. Machura, supra note 10, at 453.
166. See Vladimir Ljubanovit, Osnovna obilje-ja ostvarivanja i moguei dalji pravci
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additional rights and responsibilities to presiding judges, who may only be
professional judges. 1 73 One of the key roles assigned to the presiding
judge is the examination of defendants, witnesses, and expert wit-
nesses. 174 The presiding judge may only allow other members of the tribu-
nal to speak 175 and ask questions after the presiding professional judge
has completed his or her own examination. 1 76 For example, the examina-
tion conducted by a presiding professional judge is called the fundamental
examination, whereas the examination conducted by all other parties-lay
judges, prosecutor, defense attorney, victim, legal guardian, legal represen-
tative, co-defendants, and expert witnesses-is called the supplementary
examination. 17 7 The professional judge also has additional duties during
deliberation, such as directing the discussion, the order of which is not
predetermined by the law, and ensuring that the tribunal discusses all rele-
vant issues comprehensively and thoroughly.' 78
Furthermore, while the professional judges may access the case dos-
sier, lay judges are either explicitly prohibited by law from having access,
as in Germany, 1 79 or do not have realistic opportunities to review the dos-
sier even when allowed to do so, as in Croatia or Poland.1 80 Only one out
of eleven lay judges in Poland report reading the dossier.' 8 ' Similarly, the
majority of lay judges in Croatia report reading the dossier only occasion-
ally. 182 One of the problems with Hungarian mixed tribunals, as discov-
ered by Kulcs~r, was that they were not given sufficient time to study the
dossier in advance.' 8 3 The dossier remains locked in the professional
judges' closet or stored somewhere in the court administration offices.18 4
Either way, assuming the lay judges understand their right to read the dos-
sier ahead of trial, it requires substantial effort and determination to secure
access to the dossier. Limited access to the dossier, as lay judges in Kulc-
shr's study emphasized, creates obstacles for full and active
participation. 1
8 5
Finally, even though procedural rules provide the professional judge
with a more active trial role, if no other factors give professional judges a
higher status, then the interaction between professional judges and lay
judges during deliberations might assume more egalitarian tones. How-
ever, an additional factor that propels the professional judge into a leader-
ship position is the legalistic nature of the decision. Decisions must be
made in accordance with existing legal rules; decision-makers may not nul-
173. See Narodne novine [Criminal Procedure Law], supra note 72, § 292.
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175. See id.
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177. See id.
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lify the law, and both the defendant and prosecutor may appeal the mixed
tribunals' decision for errors of fact and law. In sum, professional judges
are "first among the equals" during legal decision-making because of their
specific status characteristics, such as legal education and experience in
deciding legal cases.186 Indeed, mixed tribunal research suggests that the
primary and dominant bases of professional judges' high status and lay
judges' low status are specific status characteristics, whereas diffuse status
characteristics play a marginal role.187
Third, giving lay judges the right to outvote the professional judge
establishes them as important players in the courtroom. Although lay
judges may disagree with and de jure outvote the professional judge, the
reality is that this happens rather rarely, and the frequency of disagreement
depends upon the stage of deliberation. The three key stages are: the lay
judge forms a different opinion from the professional judge, the lay judge
expresses the disagreement, and the lay judge must convince the majority
of tribunal members to outvote the professional judge.
According to Croatian professional and lay judges, lay judges explic-
itly disagreed with professional judges during deliberations "in only a few
cases" or "never." 188 When they disagreed with professional judges, they
rarely exercised their right to outvote them. In the domain of German
courtrooms, Casper and Zeisel examine such disagreements and report
that lay judges affected the verdict in approximately one percent of
cases. 189 Rennig reports that lay judges were several times less likely to
persuade the professional judges than the other way around. 190 Casper
and Zeisel conclude that: "The traceable overall effect of the lay judges on
the verdicts of the German criminal courts is indeed small. Whether it is
politically negligible as well is difficult to say. The answer depends upon
the goals one seeks to accomplish through lay participation."'191 However,
Machura argues that most work related to sorting out divergent opinions
occurs before the official vote takes place because the emphasis in German
courtrooms is on discussion and consensual decision-making. 192 The pro-
fessional judges' active role, mandated by procedural law, the informal
practice of summarizing the case at the beginning of deliberation, 193 and
their higher status in the tribunal all contribute to an atmosphere in which
the professional judges' voice commands discussion during deliberation.
Rather than being outvoted, the professional judge may use these tools to
persuade lay judges and gently guide them towards making the preferred
decision.
186. See Sanja Kutnjak lvkovi , An Inside View: Professional Judges' and Lay Judges'
Support for Mixed Tribunals, 25 LAw & POLICY 93, 111-18 (2003).
187. See id at 104-5.
188. KUTNJAK IVKOVIt, supra note 46, at 420-22.
189. See Casper & Zeisel, supra note 10, at 190.
190. See Rennig, supra note 10, 487.
191. Casper and Zeisel, supra note 10, at 189.
192. See Machura, supra note 10, at 463.
193. See KUTNJAK IVKOVIC, supra note 46, at 297.
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Fourth, allowing professional judges to make discretionary decisions
that affect lay judges will result in fairer opportunities for lay judges.
Research studies 194 suggest that professional judges support the theoreti-
cal idea of lay participation, but most are critical of its practical implemen-
tation. Those who opposed the idea of lay participation in the Polish study
argued that lay judges were more emotional and lenient, emphasizing that
professional tribunals were preferable. 19 5 Professional judges in the Bos-
nian and Herzegovinian study were critical of the lay judges for a wide
variety of reasons, ranging from lay participants' lack of legal knowledge,
general education, and interest, to the argument that mixed tribunals
slowed down the trial. 19 6 Ms. Sympathy and Mr. Prejudice might have
been present as well because four out of ten lay judges reported they were
sometimes influenced by their emotions in a case. 19 7 Klami and
HAmAlainen found that Finnish professional judges criticized lay judges for
being emotional, having a lower standard of proof, being too easily per-
suaded by professional judges, and revealing trial-related secrets. 198 If pro-
fessional judges share such negative opinions of lay judges, then giving
them power to make discretionary decisions about lay judges may result in
less than optimal decisions. If professional judges do not regard lay
judges' questions, comments or contributions as important, 199 then they
may be reluctant to offer lay judges adequate opportunities to express their
views, especially when the law puts the professional judge in a leadership
position.
Finally, another distortion may occur when hastily incorporating lay
participation into legal decision-making for political reasons. As a desper-
ate last-minute reformist attempt to legitimize white apartheid government
in 1991, South Africa gave professional judges, who were mostly white,
discretion whether to sit with lay judges, who were mostly black.200 Selig-
son reports that between 1991 and 1995 the overall number of cases across
the country in which lay judges participated was "exceedingly low." 20 1
Seekings and Murray surveyed and interviewed South African professional
judges (magistrates) and concluded that they opposed mixed tribunals:
Most magistrates believe that the only value of assessors is in enhancing the
legitimacy of the courts through changing public perceptions. The quality
of justice is not improved very much, although assessors can 'assist' magis-
trates by providing advice on the culture and background of the accused. As
far as most magistrates are concerned, there is nothing wrong with the qual-
ity of justice which magistrates administer; it is just that the public does not
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recognize the high quality of this justice. 20 2
As South Africa demonstrates, giving professional judges discretion to
determine whether they want lay judges to participate in legal decision-
making may result in no lay participation at all. Such discretion becomes
particularly troublesome if professional judges dislike lay judges or
directly oppose the system of lay participation.
20 3
Conclusion: Enhancing the System of Mixed Tribunals
Passing a statute to introduce mixed tribunals is merely a first and
necessary step towards successful lay participation. Many challenges and
obstacles may arise during the period between the initial proposal for
mixed tribunals and a well-developed mixed tribunal system.20 4 Several
suggestions may make the experience less troublesome and improve the
implementation of a mixed tribunal system.
First, adjust the expectations of what lay judges realistically contribute
to the legal environment that requires them to make legal decisions jointly
with a professional judge. Research studies suggest that lay judges are
inactive during trial and deliberations, 205 professional judges tend to eval-
uate lay judge participation as only "somewhat important,"20 6 and lay
judges rarely disagree with professional judges.20 7 Overall, lay judges only
occasionally exert direct influence on the decision. 20 8 Thus, in reality, lay
judges in most cases will neither introduce community values nor interpret
the laws in less formalistic ways.
Should we be disappointed With these findings? The answer depends
on our expectations. Borucka-Arctowa explained why only thirty percent
of Polish lay judges asked questions during trials: a "lay judge will inter-
vene actively only when the professional judge does not take due account
of circumstances which the lay judge feels are essential to the case, or
when the questions the lay judge poses may help to elucidate the case."'20 9
Thus, we should not expect lay judges to participate as frequently as pro-
fessional judges, safeguard every defendant, or introduce community val-
ues in each case. Otherwise, we would seriously doubt the fairness and
quality of the legal system, the way the system operates, and the quality of
professional judges. Lay judges will participate and intervene if they deem
it necessary. The mere presence of lay judges may deter professional
judges from being arbitrary, corrupt, or biased. It may also compel profes-
202. Id. at 100-1.
203. See id. at 100.
204. See Part V, supra.
205. See, e.g., KULCSAR, supra note 19; KUTNJAK IVKOVIC, supra note 46; Kubicki, supra
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208. See, e.g., Casper & Zeisel, supra note 10; Kubicki, supra note 20.
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sional judges to disclose the reasoning behind their decisions and discuss
these reasons with the lay judges. 210 Lay judges can serve as "a sounding
board"2 11 for the professional judge or, as one black magistrate in South
Africa noted, to keep professional judges "on their toes." 2 12
Second, accept and acknowledge that professional judges and lay
judges' respective roles are not identical. Borucka-Arctowa 2 13 argues that
lay judges perform a social role, which complements the professional role
of professional judges. Perceptions of lay judges in Polish mixed tribu-
nals 2 14 support this argument, as the majority of lay judges think they
counteract the tendency of statutory law to ignore "the realities of life."2 15
Professional judges likely believe that judicial decision-making requires
"no less than a law degree, a license to practice, and trial experience,"2 16
emphasizing the professional over social roles, while lay judges likely
believe that the social component carries more weight. Research studies
show that professional judges consistently support the idea of mixed tribu-
nals, but are doubtful about the actual contribution lay judges make. 2 17
The majority of professional judges in Croatia 2 18 and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina 2 19 reported that lay participation had no positive impact on the qual-
ity of legal decisions and that lay judges discussed peripheral details rather
than the main issues.220 Similarly, even though Hungarian 2 2 1 and Croa-
tian2 2 2 professional judges expressed generally positive opinions of lay
participation, professional judges also believed that there would have been
fewer wrong decisions if there had been no lay participation.
Third, provide pre-trial preparation opportunities to lay judges and
create incentives for them to participate in trials. The very courtroom
atmosphere signals to the lay judges the degree to which their participation
is expected and valued. A presiding professional judge who shows genuine
interest in lay judges' contributions and makes reasonable efforts to solicit
their input during trial and deliberation creates an environment in which
lay judges feel more comfortable. Research studies demonstrate that
"while the majority of lay judges who perceived that their comments would
be evaluated [by a professional judge] as important . . . reported making
210. Past and present experiences of powerless lay participants, such as the Revolu-
tionary Tribunal in Paris from 1793 to 1795, the Volksgerichthof during the Third Reich,
and comrades' courts in Cuba, indicate that this possibility-the deterrent function-
may not be always exercised, especially when any lack of conformity with the profes-
sional judge would result in serious consequences for the well-being of lay participants
themselves.
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comments frequently, the majority of lay judges who perceived that their
comments would be evaluated as unimportant ... reported that they made
comments infrequently."2 23 Furthermore, lay judges unable to review the
case dossier are in a disadvantaged position compared to a professional
judge. Two studies of mixed tribunals in Hungary 224 and Poland 2 25
warned that lay judges are not given sufficient opportunities to read the
case dossier in advance. Lay judges in Croatia reported that they rarely
read the case dossier, 2 26 but those who reported reading the case dossier
were more likely to report that they asked questions more often as well.2 27
Creating realistic opportunities for lay judges to review the case dossier
may provide for more thorough pre-trial preparation and jolt their interest
in the case.
Fourth, educate lay judges about the upcoming trial and their role in
the trial process. Lay judges receive neither systematic information about
the flow of the trial nor their rights and duties during the trial. As some
lay judges argued, "we were put on a playing field not knowing what game
we were playing or what was hoped to achieve." 2 28 Consequently, until
they gain some experience, novice lay judges are not familiar with the legal
environment and what is expected from them. One South African lay
judge eloquently stated:2 29
We did not know in the beginning what was expected of us.... Because the
courts were foreign to most of us as well as the rules and ethical behaviour in
courts, most of us were very nervous the first time we were used as asses-
sors .... We as assessors were thrown into the deep end without any formal
training or prior briefing.
England has required lay magistrates to take mandatory basic training
since 1966230 and the United States 2 3 1 requires pre-trial training for some
magistrates or justices of the peace as well. Lay judges who serve in mixed
tribunals should have a similar opportunity. The purpose of educating lay
judges should not be to make them experts in law, as the "lay" element
should be preserved. Rather, lay judges should obtain an introduction to
basic legal concepts and their role in the particular tribunal. Lay judges
familiar with their own rights during trials, such as asking questions or
taking notes, and with a basic knowledge of criminal procedure will feel
more comfortable in their roles and exercise their rights more frequently.
Furthermore, if lay judges know the substantive criminal law at issue, then
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they will be more effective in discussing the particular case with the profes-
sional judge and more successful in winning any arguments that may arise.
In summary, although lay judges are not as active as professional
judges during trials and deliberations, lay participation in mixed tribunals
should not be abolished. On the contrary, lay participation should be
stimulated and cherished. The key to successful lay participation is not
only enacting laws introducing lay participation, but actually implement-
ing the system in a way that provides lay participants with adequate oppor-
tunities to prepare for trial and stimulates them to participate in the
decision-making process.

